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Abstract: I argue that it was rational for chemists to eliminate phlogiston,
but that it also would have been rational for them to retain it. I do so on the
grounds that a number of prominent phlogiston theorists identified phlogiston
with hydrogen in the late eighteenth century, and this identification became
fairly well-entrenched by the early nineteenth century. In light of this identi-
fication, I critically evaluate Hasok Chang’s argument that chemists should
have retained phlogiston, and that doing so would have benefited science. I
argue that these benefits would have been unlikely, and I go on to consider
some more likely benefits and harms of retaining phlogiston. I conclude that
there is a sense in which scientific rationality concerns what is permissible,
as opposed to what is required, so that retention and elimination may, at
least sometimes, both be rationally permissible options.
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1 Introduction
The Chemical Revolution, to a first approximation, was an event that took
place in the late eighteenth century, and involved chemists embracing Antoine
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Lavoisier’s oxygen theory and abandoning phlogiston-based explanations of
various phenomena. The phenomena in question included combustion and
the transformation of metals into oxides. For some time, chemists explained
these phenomena by appealing to a substance they called phlogiston, which
they posited as a component of inflammable substances and metals. Ac-
cording to those explanations, when an inflammable substance undergoes
combustion, it loses its phlogiston; and when a metal is changed into an ox-
ide, it loses its phlogiston. But in the late eighteenth century, Lavoisier did
away with phlogiston, and explained these phenomena in terms of oxygen.
Before long, the community of chemists, as a whole, followed Lavoisier, and
they eliminated phlogiston from chemistry and embraced the oxygen theory.
Today, the literature on the Chemical Revolution is so voluminous that
it’s difficult to say anything that hasn’t already been claimed by some scholar,
and contested by another. Indeed, the first approximation that I offered in
the previous paragraph would be unacceptable to different scholars for dif-
ferent reasons.1 Considering the breadth of the literature on the Chemical
Revolution, one might suspect that nothing remains to be said about it. Ha-
sok Chang’s recent work, however, shows that this is not the case. Perhaps
the most exciting aspect of Chang’s work concerns the bold and original con-
clusion for which he argues, namely, that phlogiston was killed prematurely.
More specifically, Chang’s view is that chemists should have retained phlo-
giston, just as they did oxygen, and that science could have benefited from
this pluralistic approach.
Chang recognizes that his re-telling of the story of the Chemical Revolu-
tion bears on the issue of rationality. Although he holds that the Chemical
Revolution “was a fairly rational affair,” he locates an element of irrationality,
not in the chemists who continued to hold on to phlogiston, but in those who
embraced Lavoisier’s oxygen theory too readily (2012, p. 56). On Chang’s
understanding of rationality, if one were to admit the rationality of the re-
sponse of these latter chemists, this admission would threaten Chang’s claim
that phlogiston was killed too soon (2012, p. 51).
In this chapter, I will examine and critically evaluate the arguments that
Chang puts forward in favor of his view that chemists should have retained
phlogiston. My aim in doing so is two-fold—in short, I hope to shed some
light on the Chemical Revolution in particular, and on scientific rationality
1To take one example, Klein (2015) argues that the changes that Lavoisier inaugurated
shouldn’t be understood as constituting a revolution at all.
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more generally. Regarding the former, I take it that Chang is correct that it
would have been rational for chemists to retain phlogiston, though my way
of supporting this claim will differ from Chang’s. My view will differ from
Chang’s in another respect, insofar as I will defend the claim that it was
also rational for chemists to eliminate phlogiston. On my view, then, both
the decision to retain phlogiston and the decision to eliminate it would have
been rational, and the rationality of eliminating phlogiston needn’t threaten
Chang’s claim that it would have been rational for chemists to retain it.
My second aim is to use this view of the Chemical Revolution to illustrate
something about scientific rationality more generally, namely, that there is a
sense in which it concerns what is permissible, as opposed to what is required.
When it comes to deciding whether to retain or eliminate a given entity,
there are cases (like that of phlogiston) in which both options are rationally
permissible.
To that end, I’ll proceed as follows. In section 2, I’ll summarize Chang’s
reasons for thinking that phlogiston suffered a premature death, and that
science could have benefited if chemists had retained it. In section 3, I’ll
argue that it’s likely that the retention of phlogiston would not have led
to the benefits that Chang discusses. These benefits would have been un-
likely because a number of chemists identified phlogiston with hydrogen in
the late eighteenth century, and, as I will argue, this identification became
rather well-entrenched by the early nineteenth century. It’s likely that re-
taining phlogiston after this point would have brought about mixed results.
It could have benefited science in ways that Chang does not discuss, but
it could also have retarded scientific progress in other ways. In section 4,
I’ll use the identification of phlogiston with hydrogen in order to draw some
conclusions about the rationality of the Chemical Revolution. I’ll argue that
it would have been rational for chemists to eliminate phlogiston once they
found that various substances thought to be rich in phlogiston contain no
hydrogen. On the other hand, I’ll argue that this identification could also
have supported the rationality of retaining phlogiston, since, insofar as it was
rational to retain hydrogen, it would have been rational to retain phlogiston.
Finally, in section 5, I’ll draw some conclusions about scientific rationality
more generally.
3
2 Chang on Retaining Phlogiston
In his recent work on the Chemical Revolution, Chang claims that phlogiston
was killed prematurely, and that retaining it could have benefited science.2
Contrary to what many historians and philosophers have held, he argues
that the Chemical Revolution did not consist in a quick conversion of the
vast majority of late-eighteenth-century chemists to Lavoisier’s oxygen the-
ory. As Chang emphasizes, there were, in fact, many anti-Lavoisierians who
continued to entertain the phlogiston theory well into the nineteenth century
(2010, pp. 62–68; 2012, pp. 29–34). Chang’s claim, then, is that even after
we take this into account, the death of phlogiston was still premature.
Chang’s arguments for this claim come in four varieties. First of all,
he argues that the elimination of phlogiston resulted in the elimination of
“certain valuable scientific problems and solutions” (2012, p. 47). Chang’s
central example is familiar from discussions of so-called ‘Kuhn loss.’3 While
phlogiston theorists provided an explanation of the similarity of the metals in
terms of their shared phlogiston, oxygen theorists not only failed to provide
a solution, but ignored the very problem that the phlogiston theorists had
attempted to solve (2012, pp. 21, 43–44).4 The retention of phlogiston, then,
would have served as a reminder of certain problems and purported solutions.
Secondly, Chang argues that there were productive interactions between
oxygen and phlogiston that could have continued if the latter had been re-
tained (2012, pp. 48–50). He points out that it’s unlikely that Lavoisier
could have achieved what he did without building upon work by phlogiston
theorists like Joseph Priestley and Henry Cavendish. Chang sees no reason
why such productive interactions would have ceased if phlogiston had been
retained.
Thirdly, Chang argues that the elimination of phlogiston “close[d] off cer-
tain theoretical and experimental avenues for future scientific work” (2012,
p. 47). More specifically, he argues that, if chemists had retained phlogiston
2Chang is thus consciously engaging in counterfactual history of science (2012, pp. 62–
65), and he thus advocates the view that the results of science are contingent as opposed
to inevitable (2012, p. 288). In this chapter, I’ll follow him in both of these respects. For
more on counterfactual history, see Radick (2008) and Reiss (2009). For more on whether
the results of science are contingent or inevitable, see Soler (2008) and Kinzel (2015).
3For Kuhn’s own discussion of this example, see Kuhn (2012/1962, p. 156).
4When I write of the phlogiston theorists, I don’t mean to imply that all such theorists
defended the same theory. In fact, they often defended distinct and mutually incompatible
phlogiston theories, some of which I will discuss in section 3.1.
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alongside oxygen, it would have been possible to make more rapid progress
in theorizing about electricity and energy. These productive interactions, in
turn, lend support to Chang’s more general advocacy of pluralism in science,
which involves maintaining competing systems, and his rejection of monism,
which involves the elimination of all competing systems except for the ‘win-
ner’ (2011, pp. 425–428; 2012, ch. 5).
Fourthly, Chang argues that, by the early nineteenth century, phlogiston
and oxygen were on more-or-less equal footing, theoretically speaking. What
justified chemists in retaining oxygen was really the set of operations on
which they relied in carrying out various experiments. This justification, in
Chang’s view, would have applied equally well to phlogiston (2011, p. 420).
These latter two arguments are the most important for my purposes in the
remainder of the chapter, and so I’ll now turn to a more detailed discussion
of each of these arguments.
2.1 Phlogiston, Electricity, and Energy
Chang claims that the elimination of phlogiston resulted in the elimination
of various theoretical and experimental possibilities that would have been
beneficial for scientists to pursue.5 More specifically, he believes that, by re-
taining phlogiston, scientists could have made more rapid progress regarding
electricity, on the one hand, and energy, on the other. According to Chang,
if we were to engage in some truly whiggish history of science, there are two
entities with which we would identify phlogiston, namely, free electrons and
chemical potential energy (2009, pp. 246–250; 2011, pp. 412–423; 2012, pp.
43–48).
To begin with, there is the identification with free electrons. In Chang’s
view, the phlogiston theorists were correct that metals are similar to one
another by virtue of some shared constituent, and that this constituent is the
same thing that is released in combustion. As it turns out, it is free electrons.
This isn’t just a post hoc identification because, as Chang points out, many
phlogiston theorists, some of whom I will discuss in more detail in section
3.1, posited a connection between phlogiston and electricity. They did so, not
merely out of a desire to have a grand unified theory of all of the imponderable
fluids, of which phlogiston and electricity were two,6 but for experimental
5It’s worth noting that he thinks these benefits have since been realized “by some very
circuitous routes” without phlogiston (2012, p. 47).
6Or three, if one prefers a two-fluid theory of electricity.
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reasons as well. For example, Chang notes that it was known that electricity
could be used to change calxes (which we know as the oxides of metals) into
metals, a process that phlogiston theorists understood in terms of gain in
phlogiston. He claims that if phlogiston had been retained, along with its
posited connection with electricity, chemists would have continued to use any
methods that they could think of in order to isolate it. He argues that it’s
therefore not unreasonable to think that various electrical phenomena could
have been uncovered sooner. And he even speculates that, if phlogiston had
been retained, the discovery of the electron might have been taken for the
discovery of phlogiston.
Chang also argues that, if it had been retained, the concept of phlogiston
would have been split, in which case it would also have been identified with
chemical potential energy. His claim is that gain and loss of phlogiston can be
understood in terms of gain and loss of potential energy, and that retaining
phlogiston could have contributed to more rapid progress being made regard-
ing energy. Insofar as phlogiston was conceived of as a principle, as opposed
to a component, and insofar as it was conceived of as an imponderable fluid,
the phlogiston theorists had a way of tracking what we would now classify as
energy considerations. The oxygen theorists, on the other hand, did not. In
accordance with the idea of the conservation of matter, they focused on the
weights of substances before and after chemical reactions had taken place,
and gain and loss of energy is not something that one can keep track of in
this way.
2.2 Phlogiston Was Not Any Worse Than Oxygen
Chang also argues that, in light of the fact that oxygen and phlogiston were
on more-or-less equal footing by the early nineteenth century, it would have
been rational to retain the latter as well as the former. In order to understand
his argument, we must first look at Lavoisier’s oxygen in a bit more detail.
As Chang emphasizes, by the early nineteenth century, almost every theo-
retical claim that Lavoisier made about oxygen was proven to be false (2011,
pp. 415–420; 2012, pp. 8–10).7 Lavoisier’s oxygen theory was a theory of
combustion, among other things. He explained the heat and light that re-
sult from combustion in terms of the decomposition of oxygen gas, which
7Chang draws support from similar claims made by McEvoy (1997, pp. 22–23) and
Siegfried (1988, p. 35).
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involves the separation of oxygen base from caloric. By the early years of
the nineteenth century, this explanation was found wanting. If oxygen gas is
supposed to be the sole supporter of combustion, then Lavoisier needed an
explanation for why other gases, all of which contain caloric combined with
some base or other, do not support combustion. Even more damning is the
fact that chemists found instances of combustion that do not involve oxygen
gas at all, and so the latter could not be the sole supporter of combustion.
The oxygen theory was not just a theory of combustion, though—it was also
a theory of acidity. For Lavoisier (1965/1789, p. 65), oxygen was the principle
of acidity, that which renders the substances with which it combines acidic.
But by 1810, Humphry Davy had shown the falsity of the oxygen theory of
acidity by showing that muriatic acid (hydrochloric acid, HCl) contains no
oxygen.
In light of all of these theoretical failures, one might well wonder why
oxygen was retained at all. Chang’s answer is that the meaning of ‘oxygen’
can, at least in part, be fixed operationally in such a way that there is
continuity from Lavoisier’s time to our own (2011, p. 419). His basic idea is
that all of the operations by which Lavoisier produced oxygen gas work just
as well today as they did in the late eighteenth century.
Returning now to the case of phlogiston, Chang’s claim is that we can tell
essentially the same story. Even in light of various theoretical failures, there is
operational continuity. For example, Priestley proposed to produce phlogis-
ton by converting metals into calxes. Although today, we would understand
this reaction in terms of converting metals into oxides, the operations are
the same. And we can fix the meaning of ‘phlogiston’ operationally, in terms
of what is produced when a metal is converted to a calx. Chang uses these
considerations in order to conclude that “there was no convincing reason
for chemists to kill phlogiston in the late eighteenth century—at least no
more convincing reason than there was to kill oxygen in the early nineteenth
century” (2011, p. 420).
3 Evaluating the Benefits of Retaining Phlo-
giston
I find much with which to agree in Chang’s work on the Chemical Revolution,
and in the remainder of the chapter, I’ll indicate some of these points of
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agreement. My primary goal in this section, however, is to argue that, if
phlogiston had been retained, the benefits that Chang points to regarding
electricity and energy would likely not have materialized. My argument
hinges on the fact that a number of phlogiston theorists in the late eighteenth
century identified phlogiston with hydrogen. I’ll attempt to support the claim
that this identification was rather well entrenched by the early nineteenth
century. And I’ll argue that, as a result, retaining phlogiston would most
likely have brought about mixed results. It could have brought about some
benefits that Chang does not discuss, but it could have retarded progress in
various ways as well.
3.1 Phlogiston and Hydrogen
In the later years of the eighteenth century, a number of prominent phlo-
giston theorists identified phlogiston with inflammable air, which we now
call hydrogen.8 Cavendish was perhaps the first to make this identification.
In the course of reporting the effects of various acids on various metals, he
writes that “their phlogiston flies off, without having its nature changed by
the acid, and forms the inflammable air” (1766, p. 145). And as early as
1782, Priestley makes this identification in a letter to Josiah Wedgwood, in
which Priestley describes an experiment that, in his view, “seems to prove,
that what we have called phlogiston is the same thing with inflammable air
in a state of combination with other bodies” (in Bolton, 1892, p. 33).
While Cavendish may have been the first to make the identification,
Richard Kirwan arguably did more than any other phlogiston theorist to
defend it.9 He first proposes this identification in the notes that he provided
for the English translation of Carl Wilhelm Scheele’s Chemical observations
and experiments on air and fire. He writes of phlogiston’s “properties in its
purest state; which I take to be that of inflammable Air from metals” (in
Scheele, 1780, p. 233). As such, Kirwan’s view contrasts with that of Scheele,
who claims that “Phlogiston is a true element and a simple principle” (1780,
p. 103), but stops short of identifying it with inflammable air, which he
claims “is composed of heat and phlogiston” (1780, p. 180). Two years later,
Kirwan went on to develop the view that phlogiston and inflammable air are
the solid and gaseous states, respectively, of the same substance. He writes:
8For a detailed discussion of this identification, see Stewart (2012).
9Boantza (2008, p. 332) emphasizes Kirwan’s contribution in this regard, and dismisses
Cavendish’s earlier identification as a “fleeting observation” and an “isolated instance.”
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phlogiston . . . can never be produced in a concrete state, single
and uncombined with other substances; for the instant it is dis-
engaged from them, it appears in a fluid and elastic form, and is
then commonly called inflammable air . (1782, pp. 195–196)
Some time later, in a striking passage from his Essay on phlogiston and
the constitution of acids , Kirwan writes that “inflammable air, before its
extrication from the bodies in which it exists in a concrete state, was the
very substance to which all the characters and properties of the phlogiston
of the ancient chymists [sic] actually belonged” (1789, pp. 4–5).
After identifying phlogiston with inflammable air in his Essay , Kirwan
goes on to claim that this identification is not an idiosyncrasy of his phlogis-
ton theory, but that it has “met the approbation of the most distinguished
philosophers, both at home and abroad” (1789, p. 5). He goes on to list
a number of phlogiston theorists who, he claims, also accept this identifi-
cation, including “Dr. Priestley, Mr. Bewly, Mr. Bergman, Mr. Morveau,
De La Metherie, Chaptal, Crell, Wiegleb, Westrumb, Hermstadt, Kaersten,
&c.” (1789, p. 5). To take one example from this list, Torbern Bergman puts
forward a view that looks very much like Kirwan’s. He writes:
This principle, when in combination, and then it is properly called
phlogiston, may be set loose by various methods; having recovered
its elasticity, and gained an aerial form, by a proper increase of
specific heat, it receives the name of inflammable air. (1785, pp.
219–220)
As I’ll discuss below, there wasn’t any universal agreement among phlogiston
theorists regarding this identification, and Priestley and Cavendish in partic-
ular went on to propose other views incompatible with it. That said, there
was at least some agreement regarding the identification, and a number of
prominent phlogiston theorists did, at one time or another, defend it.
The oxygen theorists, on the other hand, identified inflammable air, not
with phlogiston, but with hydrogen gas. This identification can be seen
in the second edition of Kirwan’s Essay , which contains both Kirwan’s es-
say and responses from Lavoisier and his colleagues. In his commentary,
Lavoisier writes of Kirwan’s view that certain substances “all contain the
base of inflammable air, that is to say hydrogene [sic]” (in Kirwan, 1789, p.
22). Lavoisier, in accordance with his caloric theory of heat, thereby iden-
tifies the base of inflammable air, i.e., inflammable air minus caloric, with
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hydrogen base. It follows that hydrogen gas, for Lavoisier, is inflammable
air.
There were certainly terminological differences between the oxygen the-
orists and the phlogiston theorists. But we can exploit one of Chang’s in-
sights (which I discussed in section 2.2) in order to show a sense in which the
late-eighteenth-century phlogiston theorists’ identification of phlogiston with
inflammable air was also an identification of phlogiston with hydrogen. If
Chang is correct, then the meanings of terms like ‘phlogiston,’ ‘inflammable
air,’ and ‘hydrogen gas’ are, at least in part, fixed operationally. And if
we recognize that the chemists who used these terms produced hydrogen by
means of a shared set of operations, it’s clear that all parties, regardless
of whether they were phlogiston theorists or oxygen theorists, were talking
about the same substance, namely, hydrogen. In that case, at the operational
level, there’s good reason to identify Kirwan’s phlogiston with Lavoisier’s hy-
drogen gas (but not hydrogen base). Though, to be sure, neither side made
this identification explicitly. Moreover, given that we can produce hydro-
gen by means of the same set of operations today, we can identify Kirwan’s
phlogiston with our hydrogen.
My claim is that this identification is significant. But as Chang notes,
it was one among many attempts by phlogiston theorists to identify various
posits of their theories with various substances. Before arguing for the signif-
icance of this identification, it’s worth briefly discussing some of these other
attempts.
To begin with, as Chang points out, both Priestley and Cavendish also
identified inflammable air with phlogisticated water (2012, p. 6). We can see
Cavendish’s view in the following passage. After stating that “inflammable
air is either pure phlogiston, as Dr. Priestley and Mr. Kirwan suppose, or
else water united to phlogiston,” Cavendish writes: “Either of these suppo-
sitions will agree equally well with the following experiments; but the latter
seems to me much the most likely” (1784, p. 137).
Chang goes on to note a similarity between Cavendish’s view and another
view, which suggests a link between phlogiston and electricity (2012, pp. 44,
80). On Cavendish’s view, water is elementary, inflammable air is phlogis-
ticated water, and oxygen is dephlogisticated water. Then there is Johann
Wilhelm Ritter’s view, which shares the commitment to elementary water,
but holds that inflammable air is negatively electrified water, while oxygen
is positively electrified water. If we were to identify phlogiston with nega-
tive electricity, Cavendish’s and Ritter’s views would amount to one and the
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same view. And, indeed, some chemists did put forward views along these
lines. Chang discusses Priestley himself, who posited a connection between
phlogiston and electricity (2012, pp. 80–82). After discussing a number of
experiments, Priestley writes:
These experiments favour the hypothesis of two electric fluids , the
positive containing the principle of oxigen [sic], and the negative
that of phlogiston. These united to water seem to constitute the
two opposite kinds of air, viz. dephlogisticated and inflammable.
(1802, p. 202)
Moreover, as Chang notes (2012, p. 80), George Smith Gibbes posits a similar
connection when he claims that “[t]he principle of the negative side of the
galvanic apparatus resides in all combustible bodies, . . . and answers exactly
to the Phlogiston of Scheele” (1809, p. 13). And without giving up the
identification of phlogiston with inflammable air, Kirwan speculates “that
phlogiston, in a state perhaps 100 times rarer than inflammable air, and
consequently containing much more fire, may possibly constitute the electric
fluid” (1782, p. 210).
In order to evaluate the benefits of retaining phlogiston, the crucial issue
comes down to the extent to which the identifications between phlogiston
and various substances became entrenched in the practice of chemistry. My
claim is that the identification of phlogiston with hydrogen became rather
well entrenched, while the other identifications did not. To be sure, a full
justification of this claim would require more work than I will do here, which
will be limited to the discussion of a single, but important, source of evidence,
namely, the work of Humphry Davy, to which I’ll now turn.
3.2 Davy’s Phlogistic and Electrochemical Speculations
Davy’s work is important to consider because, as Chang notes, he was one of
a number of chemists who engaged in some “relatively maverick attempts to
employ phlogiston again for various scientific purposes” (2012, p. 65). And
of all the chemists working in the early nineteenth century, Chang singles
out Davy as “[p]erhaps the most interesting case of the new generation of
anti-Lavoisier chemists” (2012, p. 33). One might suspect that Davy’s enthu-
siasm for phlogiston, combined with his work in electrochemistry, provided
the perfect conditions for identifying phlogiston with electricity in a way that
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would become entrenched in the practice of chemistry. Indeed, Chang refer-
ences Davy’s phlogistic speculations with this possibility in mind (2012, p.
80). But Davy, in fact, maintained the identification of phlogiston with hy-
drogen throughout his work. And oftentimes he doesn’t even bother to make
this identification explicit to his readers. Such passages provide evidence
for the claim that this identification was fairly well entrenched, not just for
Davy, but for his audience as well. At this point, I’ll briefly discuss Davy’s
phlogistic and electrochemical speculations in order to make this point clear.
To begin with, as Chang points out, Davy does engage in some speculation
regarding phlogiston in his 1807 Bakerian Lecture. Davy writes:
A phlogistic chemical theory might certainly by [sic] defended, on
the idea that the metals are compounds of certain unknown bases
with the same matter as that existing in hydrogene [sic]; and the
metallic oxides, alkalies and acids compounds of the same bases
with water . . . (1808a, p. 33)
Davy goes on to consider the limitations of such a theory immediately after
introducing it. But the fact that he mentions it at all shows that he does
display some enthusiasm for phlogiston. This passage is notable for another
reason, though—if one did not have the identification of phlogiston with
hydrogen in mind when reading this passage, it would be completely unclear
why this theory is supposed to be a phlogiston theory. Hence, this passage
shows that, at this stage of his thinking, if Davy identified phlogiston with
anything, it was with hydrogen. Moreover, it shows that he expected that his
audience had made the same identification; otherwise, he would have been
more explicit about the identification and the reasons for it.
Davy continues his phlogistic speculations in another paper, published in
1808. After emphasizing the superiority of the oxygen theory, he claims that
“the only good arguments in favour of a common principle of inflammability,
flow from some of the novel analogies in electrochemical science” (1808b, p.
363). He goes on to spell out what he has in mind:
Oxygene [sic] is the only body which can be supposed to be ele-
mentary, attracted by the positive surface in the electrical circuit,
and all compound bodies, the nature of which is known, that are
attracted by this surface, contain a considerable proportion of
oxygene [sic]. Hydrogene [sic] is the only matter attracted by the
negative surface, which can be considered as acting the opposite
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part to oxygene [sic]; may not then the different inflammable bod-
ies, supposed to be simple, contain this as a common element?
(1808b, p. 363)
If we keep in mind the identification of phlogiston with hydrogen, we can
see these “novel analogies” as suggesting a kind of phlogiston theory. And
indeed, Davy goes on to identify phlogiston with hydrogen more explicitly
later in the paper, when, in the course of speculating on the nature of metals,
he writes of “the adherence of their phlogiston or hydrogene [sic]” (1808b, p.
364).
Shortly after this passage, Davy engages in some further speculation, and
considers “[o]ther hypotheses [which] might be formed upon the new electro-
chemical facts, in which still fewer elements than those allowed in the an-
tiphlogistic or phlogistic theory might be maintained” (1808b, p. 368). This
way of framing his electrochemical speculations makes it clear that, for Davy,
these hypotheses are not elaborations of either the oxygen (i.e., “antiphlo-
gistic”) theory or the phlogiston theory. That said, Davy’s motivation for
engaging in these electrochemical speculations appears to be the same as his
motivation for engaging in various phlogistic speculations. Robert Siegfried
(1964, pp. 118–119) has argued that Davy entertained various phlogistic the-
ories because of his desire to reduce the number of chemical elements, and
the same point applies to the hypotheses that Davy mentions here.
The particular hypothesis that Davy goes on to consider is based on his
observations of a coincidence between chemical states and electrical states.
Acids, being attracted to the positive surface in an electric circuit, are neg-
ative, while the alkalies and inflammable substances are positive. Moreover,
acids lose their acidic properties when they are positively electrified, while
the alkalies lose their alkaline properties when negatively electrified. Davy
concludes that, “[i]n these instances the chemical qualities are shewn to de-
pend upon the electrical powers; and it is not impossible that matter of
the same kind, possessed of different electrical powers, may exhibit differ-
ent chemical forms” (1808b, p. 368). Such a hypothesis, then, would admit
fewer elements, since the very same element may exhibit different properties
depending on its electrical powers.
In a footnote to this passage (1808b, pp. 368–369), and in some unpub-
lished notes (quoted in John Davy, 1836, pp. 405–406), Davy engages in some
additional electrochemical speculation, again with the goal of reducing the
number of chemical elements. He considers the idea that water is an element,
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and entertains a view that is the opposite of Ritter’s, namely, that hydrogen
is positively electrified water, and that oxygen is negatively electrified water.
The metals, charcoal, sulphur, phosphorus, and nitrogen are constituted of
unknown bases and hydrogen, while the acids, oxides, alkalies, and earths
are constituted of unknown bases and oxygen. The elements on this theory,
then, are water and these unknown bases.
Given that Davy engaged in these electrochemical and phlogistic spec-
ulations, one might expect him to posit some kind of connection between
phlogiston and electricity of the kind put forward by Priestley, Gibbes, and
Kirwan. Davy’s phlogistic and electrochemical speculations both involve the
idea that metals and inflammable substances contain hydrogen. And since
Davy identifies phlogiston with hydrogen, and since he often makes use of the
idea that hydrogen is positively charged, one might expect him to identify
phlogiston with some kind of electrical power. But an examination of Davy’s
work frustrates these expectations. For some time, Davy continued to enter-
tain the phlogistic idea that inflammable bodies contain hydrogen (see, e.g.,
Davy, 1809, p. 103; 1810a, p. 69). And his electrochemical speculations also
appear in subsequent work (see, e.g., Davy, 1810a, p. 62). But Davy never
identifies phlogiston with electricity, or indeed with anything other than hy-
drogen. One plausible explanation for this fact is that, for both Davy and
his audience, the identification of phlogiston with hydrogen was already too
well entrenched to consider displacing.
At this point, if I’ve established anything at all, it’s that Davy identified
phlogiston with hydrogen throughout his phlogistic speculations, and that he
wrote as if he expected his audience to have the same identification in mind.
While I take it that Davy’s work provides evidence for my claim that this
identification was, by the early nineteenth century, more well entrenched
than any other, I acknowledge that this claim requires additional work to
fully support. That said, in the remainder of the chapter, I will take this
claim for granted, and see what follows from it. But before moving on, it’s
worth briefly discussing the shape of the further work required to support
this claim, and in doing so, I’ll indicate some reasons to be optimistic about
the prospects.
As Chang notes, Davy was one of a number of anti-Lavoisierian chemists
working in the early nineteenth century (2010, pp. 63–68; 2012, pp. 30–34).
A complete justification for my claim would therefore involve looking at these
other chemists. Among them are some whom I’ve already discussed in sec-
tion 3.1, for example, Ritter, Priestley, and Gibbes. Ritter is unlikely to
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have been able to establish a more well-entrenched identification of phlogis-
ton with something other than hydrogen, since, as Chang points out, his
work on elementary water was rejected by most chemists (2012, pp. 87–94).
It’s not clear that Priestley’s posited connection between phlogiston and elec-
tricity would have fared any better, since, as Chang notes, it’s not clear how
much attention his 1802 paper received (2012, p. 82). And while Chang lists
Gibbes as one of the anti-Lavoisierians, he does not include Gibbes in a subse-
quent figure that focuses on “salient figures” from the previously mentioned
list (2012, pp. 31, 34). If Chang’s judgment regarding salience is correct,
Gibbes would not have had the influence necessary to entrench his posited
connection between phlogiston and electricity. Chang lists a number of other
anti-Lavoisierians, but Davy surely stands out as one of the most prominent
and influential. And given his phlogistic and electrochemical speculations,
his work is likely the most significant when it comes to supporting my claim
regarding the entrenchment of the identification of phlogiston with hydrogen.
So although I’ve only discussed a single source of evidence for my claim, it’s
a significant one.
3.3 Benefits and Harms of Retention
At this point, we can evaluate Chang’s claim that, if chemists had retained
phlogiston, science could have benefited. If I am right that the identification
of phlogiston with hydrogen was well entrenched by the early nineteenth
century, then if phlogiston had been retained, so would its identification
with hydrogen. And so, if we are to engage in an evaluation of the benefits
of retaining phlogiston, we must keep this identification in mind.
To begin with, I think Chang is correct about some of the benefits that
he discusses. Even if we keep the identification of phlogiston with hydrogen
in mind, it’s likely that the retention of phlogiston would have served as a
useful reminder of unsolved problems and potential solutions. Chang gives
the example of the phlogiston theorists’ explanation of the similarity of the
metals, which appealed to their shared phlogiston. Though metals do not
contain hydrogen, the reminder of the problem is useful. Moreover, if re-
taining phlogiston would have reminded oxygen theorists of various unsolved
problems, such reminders would have counted as a kind of productive inter-
action between the phlogiston and oxygen theories. Hence, I think Chang is
also correct that retaining phlogiston would have likely lead to subsequent
productive interactions.
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That said, if the identification with hydrogen was well-entrenched by
the early nineteenth century, it’s unlikely that retaining phlogiston would
have lead to the other benefits that Chang discusses, namely, more rapid
progress regarding energy and electricity. There doesn’t seem to be any
kind of direct path from phlogiston qua hydrogen to these benefits, and so
it’s likely that they would not have materialized.10 There may have been a
more indirect path to such benefits, for example, one that took into account
various electrochemical phenomena, like the fact that hydrogen is attracted
to the negative surface in an electric circuit. However, even if there were
such an indirect path, it’s not clear that the retention of phlogiston would
be needed for following that path, since oxygen theorists could also recognize
these electrochemical phenomena. More generally, in order for the retention
of phlogiston to have the benefits for which Chang argues, it had to have
been possible for chemists working in the early nineteenth century to identify
phlogiston with energy and/or electricity. And if my argument in section
3.2 is correct, the identification of phlogiston with hydrogen was so well
entrenched that it would have been difficult, but perhaps not impossible, for
an identification with electricity, energy, or anything else, to catch on.
Some unaddressed issues still remain. It’s possible that the retention of
phlogiston, along with its identification with hydrogen, could have brought
about some benefits that Chang does not discuss. And it’s also possible
that retaining phlogiston could have brought about harms. In my view, the
retention of phlogiston would most likely have brought about both benefits
and harms. In order to see this, a useful starting point is Kirwan’s framing
of what is at issue in the opposition between the phlogiston theorists and the
oxygen theorists:
The controversy is therefore at present confined to a few points,
namely, whether the inflammable principle be found in what are
called phlogisticated acids, vegetable acids, fixed air, sulphur,
phosphorus, sugar, charcoal, and metals. (1789, pp. 6–7)
Kirwan held that the inflammable principle (i.e., phlogiston, or hydrogen) is
a constituent of all of these substances, and we can inquire into the benefits
and harms of retaining a view like this.
10Mauskopf (2013, p. 625) and Kusch (2015, p. 75) both make a similar evaluation when
they claim that Kirwan’s phlogiston theory, which identified phlogiston with hydrogen, did
not have the potential to bring about the benefits that Chang discusses.
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As for the benefits of retention, acids do contain hydrogen, and so the
expectations of phlogiston theorists like Kirwan would have paid off.11 It’s
difficult not to conclude that the oxygen theory of acidity retarded progress
in determining the composition of acids. It encouraged chemists to look for
oxygen (the principle of acidity) in acids like muriatic acid (hydrochloric acid,
HCl) and prussic acid (hydrocyanic acid, HCN) that do not contain it. In
contrast, phlogiston theorists were in a better position to grasp the nature
of such acids. A case in point is Scheele, who was the first to isolate chlorine
by decomposing muriatic acid, and who held that the components of that
acid are chlorine and phlogiston (1931/1774, pp. 29–30). In the course of
presenting his own results on muriatic acid, Davy claims that Scheele’s view
“may be considered as an expression of facts,” while the oxygen theory “rests
in the present state of our knowledge, upon hypothetical grounds” (1810b,
p. 237). Perhaps if some kind of phlogiston theory had been more widely
held, and the oxygen theory had been less widely held, chemists would have
determined the composition of muriatic acid and prussic acid more quickly
than they, in fact, did. I take it that this is a plausible benefit of retaining
phlogiston.
Although some phlogiston theorists may have been in a better position to
grasp the nature of acids that do not contain oxygen, it’s debatable whether
the theories of acidity that phlogiston theorists offered were much of an
improvement over Lavoisier’s oxygen theory. Kirwan’s theory of acidity is
a kind of hybrid phlogistonist/oxygenist theory. According to his theory, the
principle of acidity is fixed air, which we know as carbon dioxide (CO2), but
which Kirwan held to be a compound of phlogiston and oxygen (1789, pp.
39, 78, 80). And on the phlogistic theory that Davy entertains in his 1807
Bakerian lecture, acids are compounds of certain unknown bases and water
(1808a, p. 33). Since both water and Kirwan’s fixed air contain oxygen, there
is a sense in which these theories are just as misguided as Lavoisier’s oxygen
theory of acidity.
That said, there’s also a sense in which these phlogiston theories of acidity
are much closer to the truth than the oxygen theory. Since both water and
Kirwan’s fixed air also contain hydrogen, these theories entail that acids
contain hydrogen. And based on two of our three current definitions of
acidity, namely, the Arrhenius definition and the Brønsted-Lowry definition,
11A caveat is in order here—Arrhenius acids and Brønsted-Lowry acids contain hydro-
gen, while Lewis acids needn’t.
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it is hydrogen ions, and not oxygen, that play an essential role in acids.
It’s admittedly a long shot to conclude that retaining phlogiston would have
enabled chemists to recognize this essential role more quickly than they, in
fact, did. But it’s at least worth considering, and it may represent another
potential benefit of retaining phlogiston.
As for the harms of retention, fixed air, sulphur, phosphorus, charcoal,
and the metals do not contain hydrogen, and so the expectations of phlo-
giston theorists would have been frustrated. Just as the oxygen theory re-
tarded progress regarding the composition of acids, it’s likely that retain-
ing phlogiston would have retarded progress regarding the composition of
these substances. After all, it would have guided chemists to continue to at-
tempt to isolate the hydrogen that these substances purportedly contain. It’s
plausible, then, that eliminating phlogiston actually benefited the scientific
investigation into the composition of these substances.
4 The Rationality of Eliminating/Retaining
Phlogiston
Now that we’ve seen that the retention of phlogiston would likely have
brought about both benefits and harms, we can examine the issue of ratio-
nality. To be sure, these are distinct issues. An evaluation of the rationality
of deciding whether to retain phlogiston in the early nineteenth century must
be independent of any subsequent benefits and harms of doing so, which were
largely unknown at the time of the decision. That said, in this section, I’ll
draw on some of the historical details from my discussion of the benefits
and harms of retention in order to argue that it was rational for chemists to
eliminate phlogiston, and that it also would have been rational for them to
retain it. But first, I’ll discuss what Chang has to say regarding the ratio-
nality of the Chemical Revolution, since I’ll be concerned to replace his view
of rationality with my own.
4.1 Chang on the Rationality of the Chemical Revolu-
tion
According to Chang (2012, p. 51), if it was rational for chemists to aban-
don phlogiston and embrace Lavoisier’s oxygen theory, then Chang’s own
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claim that phlogiston suffered a premature death would be invalidated. For
this reason, he devotes a fair amount of discussion to the rationality of the
Chemical Revolution. He begins by making the following three points, which
admittedly fall short of a comprehensive theory of rationality:
Firstly, rationality is not a matter of truth; rather, rationality is
about good ways of making judgments and decisions, given what
one knows or believes at the time. . . . Secondly, rational thinking
or discourse follows some rules or methods that are agreed within
the relevant community, to the extent that there is conscious
deliberation at all. Thirdly, the minimal condition of rationality
is instrumental: at least, a rational action must either achieve
some stated aim of the agent, or at least be intended by the
agent as contributing toward a certain aim. (2012, p. 51)12
In my view, these points suffice for the purposes of his discussion, and I’ll
adopt them in what follows.
Although Chang holds that the Chemical Revolution “was a fairly ratio-
nal affair,” there was an element of irrationality, which he locates “not in the
refusal of some chemists to go along with Lavoisier, but in the readiness of
too many others to do so” (2012, p. 56). He considers, and ultimately re-
jects, a number of arguments in the literature that purport to show that such
a conversion was rational (2010, pp. 49–61; 2012, pp. 51–56). On Chang’s
understanding of rationality, in order to sustain the claim that phlogiston
was killed prematurely, it cannot be the case that it was rational for these
chemists to abandon phlogiston and convert.13 Chang’s overall view of ra-
tionality thus entails that the rationality of eliminating phlogiston precludes
the rationality of retaining it, and vice versa. Unless Chang had this view
of rationality in mind, he wouldn’t be concerned with objecting to various
arguments purporting to show the rationality of abandoning phlogiston and
converting to the oxygen theory. It’s also worth noting that the three points
with which Chang prefaces his discussion do not entail his overall view of
12These latter two points correspond to the deontological and consequentialist concep-
tions of rationality that are often discussed in the literature on that topic. See Samuels,
Stich, and Faucher (2004, p. 166) for a good introduction to these two conceptions.
13Kusch (2015, p. 74) sees the issue in quite the same way, and claims that Chang’s
argument requires him to show that it was irrational for chemists working in the late
eighteenth century to abandon phlogiston.
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rationality. Chang’s view of rationality is one that I wish to question, and
ultimately replace, in what follows, and I now turn to that task.
4.2 Eliminating and Retaining Phlogiston are Both Ra-
tional
My own view is that it was rational to eliminate phlogiston, and it also
would have been rational to retain it. I’ll now attempt to show why both
elimination and retention would have been rational, and in doing so, I’ll once
again make use of the identification of phlogiston with hydrogen.
I’ll consider the rationality of elimination first. Once again, Kirwan’s
(1789, pp. 6–7) account of the controversy will serve as a useful way to
frame my discussion. As I’ve already noted above, Kirwan held that fixed
air (carbon dioxide, CO2), sulphur, and the metals all contain hydrogen.
By 1791, Kirwan’s failure to isolate the hydrogen that he presumed these
substances to contain led him to abandon his phlogiston theory:
I know of no single clear decisive experiment by which one can
establish that fixed air is composed of oxygen and phlogiston,
and without this proof it seems to me impossible to prove the
presence of phlogiston in metals, sulphur or nitrogen . . . (quoted
in Partington, 1961, p. 664)
It would surely be rational for chemists to eliminate phlogiston for the reasons
that Kirwan cites. More specifically, if phlogiston qua hydrogen was supposed
to be a shared component of these substances, as the evidence against the
existence of hydrogen in these substances grew, it would have been rational
to eliminate phlogiston while retaining hydrogen.
While I take it that the identification of phlogiston with hydrogen sup-
ports the rationality of eliminating phlogiston, I also see a way in which this
same identification supports the rationality of retaining it. In short, the ba-
sic idea is that, insofar as it was rational for chemists to retain hydrogen, it
would have been rational for them to retain phlogiston. To be sure, the lack
of phlogiston qua hydrogen in the substances discussed in the previous para-
graph would have frustrated the expectations of phlogiston theorists. But
these substances are only a subset of the substances that Kirwan mentions in
his account of the controversy. He also mentions acids and sugar, which do
contain hydrogen. Phlogiston theorists needn’t have held that all of the sub-
stances that Kirwan lists must contain hydrogen in order for the controversy
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to be settled in their favor. It would have been rational for them to retain
phlogiston, and conclude that it was somewhat different from what they had
initially theorized. They might have even gotten to work on determining the
role of phlogiston in acids, which could have brought about the benefits I
discussed in section 3.3.
If this conclusion seems implausible, it’s worth recalling some of the points
that Chang makes regarding oxygen, which I discussed in section 2.2. In
particular, chemists retained oxygen even after they discovered that it is
not the principle of acidity, that it is not the sole supporter of combustion,
and that the heat and light that result from combustion are not due to the
decomposition of oxygen gas into oxygen base and caloric. These discoveries
represented a significant departure from Lavoisier’s oxygen theory, and yet
it was still rational for chemists to retain oxygen. In that case, it would also
have been rational for chemists to retain a modified form of phlogiston after
acknowledging that various discoveries had shown that their initial theories
were, in various respects, incorrect.
My attempt to justify the rationality of retaining phlogiston differs from
Chang’s, though I do think that I can appeal to one of Chang’s insights in
order to strengthen my argument. In section 2.2, I discussed Chang’s idea
that the retention of oxygen was justified by the operations chemists used
to produce it. And given that phlogiston theorists also had operations for
producing phlogiston, Chang concludes that there was no more reason to
eliminate phlogiston than there was to eliminate oxygen. One issue with
Chang’s proposal is that he considers a number of distinct and mutually in-
compatible phlogiston theories, including Kirwan’s ‘inflammable air’ theory,
Priestley’s ‘electric fluid’ theory, and Cavendish’s ‘elementary water’ the-
ory. In that case, determining the set of operations for producing phlogiston
may prove difficult. But if I am right that, by the early nineteenth century,
the identification of phlogiston with hydrogen was well entrenched, then we
would have a way of determining the operations by which chemists at the
time produced phlogiston—they are just the same operations by which they
produced hydrogen. In that case, Chang’s operational justification for re-
taining phlogiston applies even more forcefully once one takes into account
the well-entrenched nature of the identification of phlogiston with hydrogen.
One may object that what I’ve pointed to here are actually considerations
that must be weighed in the course of determining whether elimination or
retention is rational, rather than considerations that show both decisions to
be rational. There may be reasons in favor of elimination, and reasons in
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favor of retention. But rationality requires weighing these reasons against
one another in order to determine the optimal decision. It may be the case
that such reasons are, indeed, equally good, which allows for the possibility
that the two decisions can be equally rational. But if this is, indeed, the
case, then perhaps I need to do more in order to show that the reasons on
each side are equally good.
In order to respond to this objection, it’s sufficient to point out that there
may be no privileged perspective from which one can weigh these reasons.
As Chang emphasizes, rationality is, at least in part, about making good
decisions based on what one believes. Furthermore, as I’ll now argue, the
outcome of weighing these reasons depends on the beliefs of those who weigh
them. To see this, we can consider the following two beliefs:
(1) Phlogiston is found in acids.
(2) Phlogiston is found in metals.
And we’ll consider two fictional early-nineteenth-century phlogiston theorists
(chemist A and chemist B), while keeping in mind that the identification of
phlogiston with hydrogen was, by this point, well entrenched.
Suppose that chemist A and chemist B both believe (1) and (2), but they
differ from one another regarding the beliefs that they are likely to abandon
in light of new evidence. Chemist A is more willing to abandon (2) than to
abandon (1), and in that sense, takes phlogiston’s role in acids to be more
central than its role in metals. In contrast, chemist B is more willing to
abandon (1) than to abandon (2), and in that sense, takes phlogiston’s role
in metals to be more central than its role in acids. Now suppose that both
discover that acids, but not metals, contain hydrogen. Given their beliefs,
the reasons in favor of retaining phlogiston will appear stronger to chemist A
than to chemist B. Moreover, the reasons in favor of eliminating phlogiston
will appear stronger to chemist B than to chemist A. Hence, given their
beliefs, we can see that, if chemist A were to decide to retain phlogiston, and
chemist B to eliminate it, both decisions would be rational.
It may be objected that this conclusion merely shows that we must move
from considering the rationality of decisions to the rationality of beliefs. Once
we can show that one chemist’s set of beliefs is more rational than the other’s,
we can show that one decision is more rational than the other. However, in
the case under consideration, this objection does not have much force since,
given the state of chemistry in the early nineteenth century, both sets of
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beliefs were rational. We can grasp this point by reference to Davy’s work.
Davy entertained both (1) and (2), and even if he didn’t believe either, the
fact that he entertained both shows that, at the time, (1) and (2) were live
possibilities. It’s therefore difficult to convict either chemist A or chemist
B of irrationality on the basis of having these beliefs. It’s also difficult to
say that it would have been irrational to have a stronger belief in (2) than
in (1) or vice versa. And since both sets of beliefs were rational, we cannot
appeal to those beliefs in order to argue that one decision would have been
less rational than the other.
At this point, I’m in a position to state my conclusions regarding the
rationality of retaining and eliminating phlogiston. Both decisions were ra-
tional, not because chemists lacked decisive empirical evidence, but because
what looked to one chemist like decisive evidence for elimination may not
have looked decisive from the perspective of some other chemist. When con-
fronted with the same set of experimental results, one chemist could have
seen decisive reasons for eliminating phlogiston, while another could have
seen decisive reasons for concluding that phlogiston, much like oxygen, is
very different from what chemists had initially theorized. Hence, at the level
of individual chemists, it was rational for them to eliminate phlogiston, and
it also would have been rational for them to retain it. When it comes to
the community of chemists more generally, I take it that it was rational for
them, as a whole, to eliminate phlogiston. But it’s also possible that those
individual chemists in favor of retaining phlogiston could have reached the
critical mass required for the community, as a whole, to retain it, and I see
no reason why it would be irrational of them to do so. It also would have
been rational for the community to embody the kind of pluralism for which
Chang argues, according to which some chemists would develop the oxygen
theory, and others would develop phlogiston theories or hybrid theories that
employ both oxygen and phlogiston. In short, when it comes to phlogiston,
both retention and elimination would have been rational.
5 Scientific Rationality More Generally
I’ll now make some brief remarks about how the arguments that I’ve pre-
sented bear on the issue of scientific rationality more generally. If those
arguments are correct, then we must admit that, when scientists are faced
with a decision between retaining and eliminating a given entity, it may be
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the case, at least sometimes, that both decisions are rational. Rationality
alone may not dictate whether scientists ought to respond to some particular
empirical results by eliminating an entity, or by retaining it in some modified
form. It’s not always the case that one decision is rationally required, while
the other is forbidden. Both decisions may be rationally permissible, and an
adequate account of scientific rationality must be able to accommodate such
cases.
I won’t attempt to develop an account of scientific rationality that ac-
commodates such cases. Instead, I’ll discuss a couple of extant views of
rationality, due to Bas van Fraassen (1989) and P. D. Magnus (2014), that,
in my view, hold some promise for accommodating such cases. Both views
are broadly pragmatist in nature, and both hold that rationality concerns
what is permitted, as opposed to what is required. On van Fraassen’s (1989,
pp. 171–172) view, “what it is rational to believe includes anything that one
is not rationally compelled to disbelieve.” And since distinct sets of beliefs
can be consistent with this prescription, van Fraassen’s account allows for the
possibility that “rational persons with the same evidence can still disagree
in their opinion” (1989, p. 175). In a similar vein, Magnus’s view “allows
for some people to rationally believe P and others to rationally believe ∼P”
(2014, p. 134). Magnus can thus acknowledge that “rationality must allow
agents in comparable circumstances to come to different beliefs; that is, epis-
temology must be permissive” (2014, p. 132). Both views thus allow for the
possibility that rational scientists could have disagreed regarding, say, their
beliefs in the existence of phlogiston. And to that extent, both views hold
some promise for accommodating cases in which retention and elimination
are both rational decisions.
There are, however, two respects in which these views would need to be
developed further in order to fully accommodate such cases. First of all, both
views concern the rationality of beliefs, and they would need to be extended
to cover the rationality of decisions, like the decision between retaining and
eliminating a given entity. Secondly, both views concern individual ratio-
nality as opposed to collective rationality, and in order to accommodate my
conclusions about the rationality of the community of chemists as a whole,
it’s necessary to say something about collective rationality. Magnus is not
silent on this issue—he puts forward his view in an attempt to show that col-
lective rationality does not require scientists to violate individual rationality.
He begins with the idea that collective rationality may require scientists to
adopt different beliefs in the same circumstances. While some philosophers
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hold that collective rationality thus requires scientists to violate individual
rationality,14 Magnus argues that it can be rational for individual scientists to
adopt different beliefs in the same circumstances. It would involve a further
step to draw the same conclusion about collective rationality, and show that,
say, different communities (perhaps sub-communities or counterfactual com-
munities) can rationally adopt different beliefs, or make different decisions,
in the same circumstances. Taking this further step would be necessary in
order to accommodate cases like the one I discussed. That said, I suspect
that, with a bit of work, a view of the kind that Magnus and van Fraassen
defend can be extended to decisions and to collective rationality.
6 Conclusion
My primary goal in this chapter has been to argue that it was rational to
eliminate phlogiston, but that it also would have been rational to retain
it. In doing so, I framed my arguments as a response to Chang’s work on
the Chemical Revolution. I also attempted to show that the identification
of phlogiston with hydrogen, as made by a number of prominent phlogis-
ton theorists in the late eighteenth century, became rather well-entrenched
by the early nineteenth century. I employed this identification in order to
evaluate the benefits and harms of retaining and eliminating phlogiston, re-
spectively, and in order to evaluate the rationality of these two decisions.
And I concluded that, more generally, scientific rationality concerns what is
permissible, as opposed to what is required.
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